

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

Retraction

AMLANFOR staff officers began planning for retraction of U.S. forces shortly after their arrival. The lessons learned in the initial load-out proved valuable as retraction proceeded smoothly. The units, especially the service units, now had practical experience in making loading plans and manifests for sea and air movements. By departure time, they had diverted unneeded supplies and finished the final inventory of supplies on the ground. The greatest benefit of the deployment was the application of lessons learned for a smooth retraction. Most important, the tactical and political environment enabled the unit to plan and implement a phased withdrawal.

The withdrawal went well because it was the entire command's sole task after October 1958. Headquarters, AMLANFOR, terminated operations on 20 October, and all except a small rear party of the 201st Logistical Command had departed by 24 October 1958.¹ The small rear party departed in November, and the 201st Logistical Command was formally deactivated on 14 November 1958.²

General Adams was determined to take all on-hand supplies back with the command. His men did this, with the exception of several tons of ammunition that had been dumped into the sea. The force could do this because the units had just completed a traumatic move and they had the time to inventory available supplies and to plan for their retrieval. Most U.S. units moved to Lebanon in less than a week, while the withdrawal took over thirty days. The lesson of the retraction operation is that all the units knew the plans and, thus, were better able to execute them without major snags.

Summary

General Adams's forces accomplished the overall mission in Lebanon. They followed existing contingency plans, and the U.S. Army demonstrated its ability to deploy rapidly. The operation also served as a practical test of an emerging logistical doctrine of tailoring support forces to a specific ground force mission. Furthermore, the planning process provided valuable lessons for future operations.

The tailoring of logistical forces worked, but not without drawbacks. The designated support units must have a working knowledge of the plans so that they can devise complementary plans. Support units, like combat units, must train together to ensure teamwork. Higher headquarters must integrate the nonorganic combat service support units into the planning process and ensure that those units have an opportunity to rehearse the aspects of plans that affect their operations.

Another critical aspect of the planning process is worst-case planning. Worst-case planning means forecasting the worst situations that a deployed force may encounter. Worst-case planning, in conjunction with a logistical doctrine of pushing supplies forward, might have led to the problems encountered in Lebanon during 1958 and to similar problems in the Dominican Republic during 1965. The after-action reports of the Dominican Republic operation read as if they applied to Lebanon. These reports stated that the automatic resupply procedures were not sufficiently flexible to cope with changing requirements. One of these after-action reports, Operation Debrief, declared that "all interviewees stated that to some degree the automatic resupply was wasteful, inadequate, uneconomical, and generally mixed up." Moreover, the procedures to change automatic resupply were inadequate or nonexistent. Similar conclusions were reached for the earlier Lebanon operation. Although the automatic resupply or push system (the buildup of supplies according to levels for X number of days) met requirements, it was labor intensive and did not readily adapt to changing situations. It also required secure, spacious areas for storage, particularly if units did not consume the supplies immediately. This system created waste and piles of unused supplies.

As mentioned earlier, these factors were caused by worst-case planning in conjunction with this particular logistical doctrine. In Lebanon, the lack of fighting (a best-case situation) freed manpower to handle massive resupply shipments. In this situation, worst-case planning did not balance the need for combat power against a labor-intensive logistical effort. If worst-case planning had come to fruition and heavy fighting had ensued, then the logistical effort would have been severely taxed. A dilemma develops in planning for heavy combat between the size of the fighting forces and that of follow-on support. Only by engaging in limited or no fighting would the manpower be freed to manage the logistical system. A solution is to combine the push-pull systems. Furthermore, such a system comes closest to the goal of just-in-time logistics.

The logistical doctrine used by the U.S. Army during the 1983 operation in Grenada was a combined push-pull system. Logistical personnel had prepackaged supplies designed for a Grenada-type contingency operation. The units that deployed to Grenada also preconfigured resupply packages. Generally, these supplies were sent to the operational area on request by the deployed unit, but an automatic system was also used for certain resupply (mainly ammunition) items. In this case, the system was flexible enough to change the packages based on actual requirements. In some instances, supply personnel on Grenada made requests for special items, which normally would have taken at least a day; yet, a few minutes after their request, a plane would land carrying the needed items. The logistical personnel had already anticipated that request, and these instances indicated the close working relationship between the deployed force and the logistical personnel. It may be years before full disclosure of the Grenada operation can be made, but, based on the Lebanese and Dominican Republic experiences, the combined push-pull system appears to be the best of both worlds.

The operational lessons of the Lebanese operation are as old as military art itself and are just as critical now as at any time in the past. The detailed execution of plans, such as the proper implementation of loading plans, and the meticulous marking of cargo manifests are crucial. Practice exercises and rehearsals are needed to ensure this capability. Unrealistic loading plans will disrupt the best-made plans for a strategic movement. Inattention to detail adds confusion in the objective area and belies efficient planning.

Planning for the deployment of the airborne battle group was, in the sense of mission accomplishment, effective. But there were significant omissions in joint and theater planning, particularly for the resupply of potable water and medical support and for civil affairs.

In planning for water resupply, well-digging teams were assigned to the force. Finding a potable water supply in Lebanon, even within a secure area and with local cooperation, proved difficult. In a hostile environment, it could have proved catastrophic. Even such solutions as providing off-shore water tankers or saltwater converters would have been vulnerable in a hostile environment.

The cooperation, coordination, and planning for medical support were inadequate. More must be done for future operations, for this is a fairly simple joint

planning task. After the Lebanese operation, the Army again streamlined medical resupply and confirmed a need to keep medical resupply in medical channels.

Civil affairs and procurement activities were other areas in which planning failed. The plans did not provide adequate guidance to the commander, and, therefore, these activities were only accomplished through support provided by the U.S. embassy and the time available because of the nonhostile situation. Any future planning must seriously consider the civil-military arena.

Finally, at the unit level, the commander and staff officers involved in a deployment will inevitably encounter varying degrees of confusion and poor coordination. Once the unit is en route to the objective area, the commander will feel relieved, but many nagging questions will remain. Overclassification and rigid planning compartmentalization breed confusion. Therefore, the planner must balance security requirements with the units' need to know. Improperly disseminated plans not only promote confusion, but also occasion slovenly appearance and poor performance. The most important planning lesson from the Lebanese experience is that planners must use a classification commensurate with security requirements and not create a smug in-the-know elite. If security restrictions prevent units from learning their assigned roles in a mission, it is self-defeating.

Prior planning and rehearsal of the support function are equally important to the success of a mission. In the case of Lebanon, Grandios, the deployment rehearsal plan for the combat units, proved to be the U.S. forces' salvation. Equal consideration must be given to logistical units. Rehearsal also implies training, and training logistical units as a team must be accomplished.

APPENDIX A

PLANS

Swaggerstick: Unilateral U.S. Army plan for Middle Eastern contingency operations.

CINCSPECOMME 215-58: A plan prepared by the Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East, for conducting various types of military operations in Middle East countries. Primary consideration was the military implications of the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East.

CINCAMBRITFOR OPLAN 1-58 (Bluebat): A combined plan in which the U.S. portion was an adaptation of the plan for Lebanon contained in CINCSPECOMME 215-58. This was then coordinated with the British War Office for conducting a combined U.S.-U.K. operation. The JCS ordered that the U.S. portion of this plan be executed for the Lebanese operation.

USAREUR EP 201: A plan prepared by USAREUR in support of the CINCSPECOMME plan for Middle East operations.

24th Infantry Division EP 201: A plan prepared by the 24th Infantry Division in support of USAREUR EP 201.

Grandios: The 24th Infantry Division's load-out and marshaling plan in support of EP 201.

APPENDIX B

TASK FORCE 201

<u>Alpha Force</u>	<u>Bravo Force</u>	<u>Charlie Force</u>	<u>Delta Force</u>	<u>Echo Force</u>
1st Abn BG, 187th Inf	1st Abn BG, 503d Inf	TF HQ	HQ & ADM Tm, 85th Cml Bn	Tk Bn
LNO Arty Btry		Cbt Engr Bn	Sup Tm, 85th Cml Bn	
Engr Plt		A Btry, 13th FA Bn	Maint Tm, 85th Cml Bn	
Cbt Spt Plt		C Btry, 13th FA Bn	Unit Mess Tm, 85th Cml Bn	
Fwd Air Controller		AAA Btry	Fld Maint Tm, 581st Engr Co	
Cbt & Gp Flt HQ		Trp C (Recon), 2d Sqd, 9th Cav	Engr Const Bn, 79th Engr Bn	
TF Trp		E Co (Abn), 3d Engr Bn	2 Well Drill Tms, 7th Engr Bde	
TF Tac HQ		Det, 24th Avn Co	Pdn Plt, 687th Water Sup Co	
Prov Arty HQ		Det, 24th QM Co		
Clearing Plt		HHC, Log Comd A		
Advance Pty COMMZ				

<u>Alpha Force</u>	<u>Bravo Force</u>	<u>Charlie Force</u>	<u>Delta Force</u>	<u>Echo Force</u>
Det, 24th Sig Bn (Abn)		MP Co (-Plt), 382d MP Bn	Depot Sup Tm, USA Engr Dep	
	1 Co Engr Const, 79th Engr Bn		Army Surg Hosp, Hel Amb Tm, 47th Med Det	
	Evac Hosp (Semi- Mbl), 58th Evac Hosp		Prev Med Co (Sep) (-), 485th Prev Med Co	
	1 Plt Amb Co, 30th Med Gp		Prev Med Sup Tm, USA Med Det	
	Dir Spt Co, 47th Ord Gp		Amb Co (-Plt), 30th Med Gp	
	Mag Plt, Ammo Co, 57th Ord Gp		Vet Food Insp Tm	
	Bath Plt (-), QM Gp		Ord EOD Tm, 85th EOD Det	
	Unit Mess Tm, 15th QM Bn		Bakery Plt (-), 134th QM Co	
	POL Sup Plt (-), 215th QM Bn		Co HQ Tm, 2d QM Gp	
	Sup Tm, QM Gp		Ldry Plt (-), 2d QM Gp	
	Aerial Sup Tm, 557th AS Co			

<u>Alpha Force</u>	<u>Bravo Force</u>	<u>Charlie Force</u>	<u>Delta Force</u>	<u>Echo Force</u>
		Stor & Iss Sec, 545th Sig Co	Unit Mess Tm, 15th QM Bn	
		Prov Det ASA (USASAE)	Mess Tm Aug, 2d QM Gp	
		1 Co, 533d Trk Co	Autmv Maint Tm (-), 2d QM Gp	
		Prov Port Supv Det, 11th Trans Bn	Autmv Maint Tm, 2d QM Gp	
			Labor Tm, 95th QM Gp	
			Plt HQ Tm, 2d QM Gp	
			POL Lab Tm (-), 2d QM Gp	
			GRREG Plt, 565th QM Co	
			Salv Tm, 2d QM Gp	
			Sig Spt Co (-), 160th Sig Spt Gp	
			Photo Tm, 97th Sig Bn	

<u>Alpha Force</u>	<u>Bravo Force</u>	<u>Charlie Force</u>	<u>Delta Force</u>	<u>Echo Force</u>
			Radio Rpr Tm, USA Sig Dep	
			Trans Trk Bn (HHC), 38th Trk Bn	
			Lt Trk Co (Aug), 82d Lt Trk Co	
			2d Lt Trk Co (ROCID) (Aug), 125th Trk Bn	
			Med Trk Plt (Refrig), 1st Trk Co	

APPENDIX C

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FOR ALPHA, BRAVO, AND CHARLIE FORCES

Alpha Force

<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Equipment</u>	
TF Troops	200	3/4-T Trk	18
TF Tac HQ	(80)	1 1/2-T Tlr*	3
Prov Arty HQ	(2)	1/4-T Trk	57
Clearing Plt	(40)	2 1/2-T Trk*	3
Prcht Sup &		1 1/2-T w/Tlr	5
Maint Det	(26)	3/4-T Tlr	8
Adv Pty COMMZ	(4)	1/4-T Tlr	46
Det, 24th Sig		106 RCLR	16
Bn (Abn)	(48)	H-13	1
		L-19	2
Abn Cbt Tm	1,483	Water Purif	2
		TOE Equip	
Abn BG	(1,425)	Class I	
LNO Arty Btry	(2)	Class III	
Engr Plt	(33)	Class V	
Cbt Spt Plt	(13)	Water	
Fwd Air		Delivery Equip	
Controller	(1)	Total STON	<u>470</u>
Cbt Gp Flt HQ	(9)		
Adv Pty, Abn BG	10		
(Bravo Force)			
	<u>1,693</u>		
	217 STON		

Recapitulation

Personnel	1,693	217 STON
Equipment		470 STON
	<u>1,693</u>	<u>687 STON</u>

*Airlanded

Bravo Force

<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Equipment</u>	
TF Trps	54	3/4-T Trk	10
		1/4-T Trk	41
TF Adv HQ	(43)	1 1/2-T w/Tlr	2
Prov Arty HQ	(6)	3/4-T Tlr	9
Adv Pty COMMZ	(5)	1/4-T Tlr	40
		106 RCLR	16
Abn Cbt Tm	1,483	H-13	1
		L-19	2
Abn BG	(1,425)	TOE Equip	
LNO Arty Btry	(2)	Class I	
Engr Plt	(33)	Class III	
Cbt Spt Plt	(13)	Class V	
Cbt Gp Flt HQ	(9)	Water	
Fwd Air		Delivery Equip	
Controller	(1)	Total STON	384
	<u>1,537</u>	201 STON	

Recapitulation

Personnel	1,537	201 STON	
Equipment		394 STON	
	<u>1,537</u>	595 STON	

Charlie Force

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Weight</u>
Aerial Sup Tm, 557th AS Co	18	15
Sup Tm, 2d QM Gp	19	30
Mag Plt, Ammo Co, 57th Ord Gp	30	9.5
TF HQ	151	279
Det, 724th Ord Bn (Abn)	46	54.4
HHC, Log Comd A	69	16
POL Sup Plt (-), 215th QM Bn	54	80
Prov Port Sup Det, 11th Trans Bn	9	1.2
MP Co (-1st Plt), 382d MP Bn	102	21.2
Evac Hosp (Semi-Mbl), 58th Evac Hosp	181	161.3
Sig Spt Co (-), 595th Sig Spt Gp	55	22
Unit Mess Tm, 15th QM Bn	4	4.6
Bath Plt (-), 2d QM Gp	20	10.2
Engr Co (Cbt), Engr Bn	165	236
Trp C (Recon) Abn, 2d Sqd, 9th Cav	157	94
A Btry, 13th FA Bn (Abn)	115	107.7
C Btry, 13th FA Bn (Abn)	115	107.7

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Weight</u>
Prov Arty HQ	39	21.9
D Btry (762 Rkt), 34th FA Bn	56	123.1
Prov Det ASA (USASAE)	64	104
E Co (-) 3d Engr Bn (Abn)	42	165
Det 24th Sig Bn (Abn)	62	24
1st Amb Plt (Abn) 124th Med Bn	28	14.3
Det, 24th Avn Co	62	0
Det, 24th QM Co	39	38
	<u>1,702</u>	<u>1,740.1</u>

APPENDIX D

ON-HAND SUPPLIES, 31 AUGUST 1958

	<u>Beirut</u>	<u>Adana</u>
Class I		
A Rations		
B Rations	200,185	
Cbt Rations	<u>49,005</u>	
Total Tons	249,190.	
Days of Sup	29.3	
Classes II and IV		
Total Tons	1,227.2	514
Class III		
AVGAS	18,709 gal	
MOGAS	96,000 gal	
MOGAS (Bulk)	<u>4,773 gal</u>	
Total	119,482 gal	2,106 gal
Days of Sup	26.8	
Class V		
Ordnance	1,102 STON	1,000
Chemical	<u>16.8 STON</u>	
Total Tons	1,118.8	1,000
Total Consumption for August		
Water	1,469,296 gal	
MOGAS	199,209 gal	
AVGAS	23,093 gal	

Stored Supplies

Adana

	<u>Stored 1-14 Sep</u>	<u>Total</u>
QM II and IV	2.4	12.5
Ord II and IV	5.2	28.5
Sig II and IV	24.1	33.0
QM III	0	1,775.4
Ord V	2,090.0	2,890
Ord Veh	6.7	136
Cml V	.5	.5
Total Tons	<u>2,138.9</u>	<u>4,875.9</u>

Beirut

On-Hand (14 Sep)

Class I

B Rations	69,510
Cbt Rations	47,694
Five-in-One	1,095

Class II and IV 1,975.3 STON

Class III

MOGAS	128,440 gal
AUGAS	63,606 gal

Class V

Ord	1,034 STON
Cml	1,683 STON

NOTES

Introduction

1. For further study, see Roger J. Spiller, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon, Leavenworth Paper no. 3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, January 1981).

2. H. H. Lumpkin, "Operation Blue Bat," appendix dated 4 November 1958, to an enclosure, by U.S. European Command dated 17 November 1957, and with subject "Chronology of Operation 'Blue Bat,'" to a Memorandum for the Director, J-2, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC, 26 November 1958), 4 (hereafter cited as Lumpkin, "Operation Blue Bat").

3. Press Release no. 280, 6, John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ.

4. U.S. American Land Forces, Lebanon, "After Action Report, 15 July 58 to 25 October 58, 2d Prov. Marine Force, 24th ABN Brig., 201st Log Cmd," 25 October 1958, 1 (hereafter cited as AMLANFOR, "AAR").

5. "The History of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff," sanitized ed., 442, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives, Washington, DC.

6. Lumpkin, "Operation Blue Bat," 4.

7. Support Force Speidel to Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division, 9 August 1958, 4 (hereafter cited as SF Speidel to CG), in U.S. Army, 24th Infantry Division, "After Action Report Operation Grandios, 15-31 July 1958," 5 November 1958 (hereafter cited as 24th ID, "AAR Grandios"). Robert E. Farrell, "Beirut Tests One-Manager Airlift Concept," Aviation Week 69 (11 August 1958):25-27, quotes an unofficial source that set the number of air sorties at 418. This number appears in several later sources. The number 242 denotes the number of aircraft loaded by Support Force Speidel.

8. H. B. Yoshpe and J. Bykofsky, comps., "Lebanon, a Test of Army Contingency Planning," Brief Surveys of the Post-Korean Experience Series (Washington, DC: Chief of Transportation, U.S. Army, 25 November 1958), 21 (hereafter cited as Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon").

Chapter 1

1. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, CGSC 1957-58, "Regular Course Afteraction, Subject nr. 5600-I/8: Introduction to Administrative Support Within Theaters of Operation (Atomic)," pt. 1, "Introduction to Large-Scale Administrative Support," by H. G. Stover, Lt. Col., MPC (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 February 1958), 2-1 (hereafter cited as CGSC, "Regular Course").
2. Ibid., 4-1.
3. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966), 518.
4. CGSC, "Regular Course," 4-1.
5. U.S. Army Service Forces, Logistics in World War II, Final Report of the Army Service Forces, A Report to the Under Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff by the Director of the Service, Supply, and Procurement Division, War Department General Staff, 1 July 1947 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 49 (hereafter cited as ASF, Logistics).
6. Huston, Sinews, 557-78.
7. ASF, Logistics, 23-24.
8. Huston, Sinews, 578.
9. CGSC, "Regular Course," 4-1.
10. Ibid., 4-2.
11. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations: Administration, 21 October 1954, 29.
12. Huston, Sinews, 639.
13. Ibid.
14. CGSC, "Regular Course," 4-2.
15. Ibid., 497.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 640.

18. Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Adam W. Meetze to Col. William A. Stofft, 30 July 1982.
19. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 3-4.
20. Ibid., 6.
21. Ibid., 8.
22. Ibid., 8 n. 9.
23. Ibid., 8-9.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 10. So as not to "jeopardize higher priority projects," the Air Force, in 1957, canceled production of the new C-132, which was designed to carry 60 tons about 3,500 miles. This action conflicted with the Army's need for newer, heavier, and longer range aircraft. Studies were being conducted, including one for new water-based aircraft, but these were ongoing projects at the time of the Middle East crisis. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 10.
26. Farrell, "Beirut Tests," 25.
27. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 11.
28. Ibid., 13-14.
29. Ibid., 14.
30. Ibid., 15.
31. U.S. Army, Infantry Conference, Fort Benning, GA, 1958, "Infantry Conference Report 1958: The Lebanon Operation (U)," comments presented by Brig. Gen. David W. Gray, Assistant Division Commander, 24th Infantry Division, 20 February 1959, 211-12 (hereafter cited as "Infantry Conference Report," Comments).
32. Ibid., 212.
33. Ibid.
34. Maj. Gen. (Ret.) David W. Gray, manuscript of his experiences in Lebanon, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9.
35. Interview with Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Adam W. Meetze, Princeton, NJ, 12-15 September 1982.

36. U.S. Army, Europe, "Emergency Plan 201," 26 February 1958, (hereafter cited as EP 201).
37. Ibid., sect. IV, 6-7.
38. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 17.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 18.
41. EP 201, annex D.
42. Ibid.
43. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 24.
44. Col. (Ret.) Dan K. Dukes to Col. William A. Stofft, 9 November 1982.
45. Meetze interview.
46. Meetze to Stofft.

Chapter 2

1. 24th ID, "AAR Grandios," 1.
2. Gray manuscript, 11.
3. Ibid., 9.
4. 24th ID, "AAR Grandios," 12.
5. Gray manuscript, 9.
6. Ibid., 10.
7. Ibid., 16.
8. U.S. Army Task Force 201, Provisional Airborne Brigade, "Command Report for 15-31 July 1958 (U)," Report to Adjutant General, Department of the Army, 13 August 1958, 2 (hereafter cited as PAB, "Command Report").
9. Gray manuscript, 17.
10. SF Speidel to CG, 1.
11. U.S. Army, 11th Airborne Division, "Administrative Plan Grandios," 26 May 1958, 3.

12. AMLANFOR, "AAR," pt. 2, sect. 3, 2.
13. Meetze interview.
14. Gray manuscript, 16.
15. Ibid., 54.
16. U.S. European Command, "Blue Bat Critique, 2-3 December 1958: Final Report on Critique of USCINCEUR participation in CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58," 12 December 1958, 15 (hereafter cited as "Blue Bat Critique").
17. Gray manuscript, 12.
18. Ibid., 18, 9.
19. PAB, "Command Report," 394.
20. Meetze to Stofft.
21. Farrell, "Beirut Tests," 25.
22. Gray manuscript, 24; PAB, "Command Report," 4.
23. Gray manuscript, 24. One airplane was produced in a matter of minutes because it happened to be over Fürstenfeldbruck en route to Évreux when the pilot got the word; the pilot simply lowered the wheels and landed.
24. PAB, "Command Report," 3-4.
25. Gray manuscript, 21-22.
26. Brig. Gen (Ret.) George S. Speidel to Col. William A. Stofft, 20 September 1982.
27. PAB, "Command Report," 4.
28. "Blue Bat Critique," 15.
29. Gray manuscript, 56.
30. Farrell, "Beirut Tests," 26.
31. SF Speidel to CG, 1.
32. Ibid., 4-5.
33. Speidel to Stofft.

34. Gray manuscript, 26.
35. Ibid.
36. SF Speidel to CG, 5.
37. Gray manuscript, 25.
38. PAB, "Command Report," 3.
39. Meetze to Stofft.
40. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 20.
41. U.S. Army, 201st Logistical Command, "Historical and Command Report," 15-31 July 1958, 1 (hereafter cited as 201st LC, "Report").
42. Gray manuscript, 32.
43. Ibid., 32-33.
44. Ibid., 34.
45. "Blue Bat Critique," 49.
46. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 20.
47. Gray manuscript, 35.
48. "Blue Bat Critique," 18.
49. Ibid., 18.
50. Ibid., 53.
51. Ibid., 21.
52. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 21.
53. Ibid.
54. 201st LC, "Report," 15-31 July 1958, 2.
55. Meetze interview.
56. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 21.
57. Ibid.

58. U.S. Army, Europe, "Lessons Learned from the Lebanon Operation," Memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Staff to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, n.d., tab D, 2.

59. AMLANFOR, "AAR," annex G, sect. 4, pt. 2, subsect. B, 2.

60. "Blue Bat Critique," 45.

61. 201st LC, "Report," 1-31 August 1958, 56.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., 55.

64. "Blue Bat Critique," 45.

65. Gray manuscript, 28.

Chapter 3

1. "Blue Bat Critique," 3.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Gray manuscript, 46.

5. "Blue Bat Critique," 3.

6. Ibid.

7. Gray manuscript, 26.

8. Oral history, Gen. (Ret.) Paul D. Adams Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 24.

9. Gray manuscript, 48.

10. Oral history, Adams Papers, 24-25.

11. U.S. Army, 201st Logistical Command, TFSP0 250/16: "Mission Statement of Headquarters, 201st Logistical Command," 26 September 1958, 1 (hereafter cited as "Mission Statement, 201st Log Comd").

12. Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Commanding Officer, U.S. American Land Forces, Specified Command, Middle East, to

Col. Adam W. Meetze, Commanding Officer, Support Command, "Letter of Instructions," 30 July 1958.

13. "Mission Statement, 201st Log Comd," 1-2.

14. Ibid., 3.

15. Ibid.

16. Dukes to Stofft.

17. Meetze to Stofft.

18. Dukes to Stofft.

19. Ibid.

20. Gray manuscript, 4. In determining class II supplies for individual equipment, General Gray noted that pith helmets were included. General Gray related, "I had participated in a test of this headgear at Ft. Benning in 1934, a test which rejected the helmet as unsuitable for field duty, so I asked that it be stricken from the plan." It was not, but he made "excellent use of about ten of them for the lifeguards on the swimming beach that we established."

21. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 22.

22. Meetze to Stofft.

23. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 22-23. Concurrent with a reduction in sealift, a CONUS emergency air resupply provided a total of sixty-seven Signal Corps personnel and 164 short tons of Signal Corps, Quartermaster Corps, and Army map service cargo. This suggests planners had ignored these specialists and special technical items or else the men had not been available for deployment with the troops stationed in Europe.

24. Ibid., 23.

25. Meetze to Stofft.

26. AMLANFOR, "AAR," sect. 4, pt. 2, subsect. B, 6-7.

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28. Ibid., 10, 19-20.

29. U.S. American Land Forces, Lebanon, "Administrative Order 1-58," 31 August 1958, 1 (hereafter cited as AMLANFOR, "AO 1-58").
30. AMLANFOR, "AAR," sect. 4., pt. 2, subsect. B, 5.
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32. 201st LC, "Report," 1-31 August 1958, 62.
33. AMLANFOR, "AO 1-58," 1.
34. 201st LC, "Report," 1-31 August 1958, 62.
35. "Blue Bat Critique," 37.
36. Ibid.
37. AMLANFOR, "AAR," sect. 4, pt. 2, subsect. B, 6.
38. 201st LC, "Report," 1-31 August 1958, 30.
39. Dukes to Stofft.
40. AMLANFOR, "AAR," sect. 4, pt. 2, annex D, subsect. C, 4.
41. "Blue Bat Critique," 44.
42. U.S. Army, 201st Logistical Command, "Local Procurement of Real Estate, Services and Supply," Staff Study, 12 November 1958, 1 (hereafter cited as 201st LC, "Local Procurement").
43. U. S. Army Communications Zone, Europe, Office of the Director of Procurement, "After Action Report on Procurement, 201st Log Cmd (A)," 16 October 1958, 1 (hereafter cited as ACZE, "AAR").
44. Ibid., comment 1, AEZPD 250/17: "After Action Report, EP 201," 31 October 1958, 1 (hereafter cited as ACZE, "AAR," comment 1).
45. ACZE, "AAR," 1-2.
46. 201st LC, "Report," 15-31 July 1958, 7-8.
47. Ibid., 7. The director of procurement described the procurement practice in a 16 October 1958 report. As definite requirements became known, the contracting officer contacted the appropriate vendors through the embassy. One or more vendors would respond and, after a price was agreed on, the vendor would receive a verbal

order to deliver the required supplies or services. The government thus became obligated through the verbal order of the contracting officer and the subsequent performance of the contractor(s). Occasionally, some typing assistance was available from embassy personnel and, by 31 July 1958, thirteen purchase orders, totaling \$5,375.00 had been written. However, the government was also obligated, without benefit of written contract(s), for various supplies; building rentals; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; quarters rental; rail transportation (cargo); and motor transportation (cargo and personnel) and for the cost of unloading ships. As of 31 July, these additional known obligations were estimated to be approximately \$30,000. ACZE, "AAR," 1-2.

48. 201st LC, "Local Procurement," 2.

49. Ibid., 1.

50. 201st LC, "Report," 15-31 July 1958, 7.

51. U.S. Army, 201st Logistical Command, "Answers to CONARC and XVIII ABN Questionnaire," 6 October 1958, 2.

52. ACZE, "AAR," comment 1, 2.

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56. Meetze to Stofft; DOD, "Civil Affairs," 7-8.

57. DOD, "Civil Affairs," 3.

58. Ibid.

59. "Blue Bat Critique," 28-30.

60. DOD, "Civil Affairs," 4.

61. Ibid., 5.

62. Ibid.

63. "Blue Bat Critique," 29.

64. Ibid.

65. DOD, "Civil Affairs," 9.
66. Ibid., 9-10.
67. Ibid., 10-11.
68. Ibid., 13.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid., 14.
71. Col. (Ret.) Richard M. Hermann to Col. William A. Stofft, 25 August 1982.
72. U.S. Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary (Health and Medical), "Evaluation of Medical Service Support for the Lebanon Operation," 18 February 1960, 15 (hereafter cited as DOD, "Evaluation").
73. Ibid., 3.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., 14.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., 13.
78. Ibid., 14.
79. "Blue Bat Critique," 37.
80. DOD, "Evaluation," 7-8.
81. 201st LC, "Report," 1-31 August 1958, 40.
82. Ibid.
83. DOD, "Evaluation," 12.
84. Gray manuscript, 3.
85. Ibid.
86. "Infantry Conference Report," Comments, 228.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.

89. 201st LC, "Report," 1-31 August 1958, 24.
90. 201st LC, "Report," 15-31 July 1958, 3.
91. 201st LC, "Report," 1-31 August 1958, 7.
92. Meetze to Stofft.

Chapter 4

1. 201st LC, "Report," 13 October-30 November 1958, 1.
2. U.S. Army, Europe, General Order 348, 10 November 1958.

GLOSSARY

AMLANFOR: American Land Forces.

ATF 201: Army Task Force 201.

Automatic requisitions: Equipment, materiel, repair parts, and resupply necessary to support an operation in the planning phase and would on a predetermined time schedule be sent to a using unit. Automatic requisitions are used to maintain a specific stockage level in the forward areas.

BG: Battle Group.

CALSU: Combat air logistic support unit.

CINC: Commander in Chief.

CINCNELM: Commander in Chief, Naval Element, Mediterranean.

CINCSPCOMME: Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East.

CINCUSAFE: Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Europe.

COMAIRSPECOMME: Commander, U.S. Air Forces, Specified Command, Middle East.

COMAMLANFOR: Commander, American Land Forces.

Combat loaded: A method of loading essential equipment and supplies so that they can be unloaded ready for action.

Combat service support: Services provided to combat troops, such as maintenance of equipment, repair parts, quartermaster resupply, laundry services, ammunition resupply, etc.

Communications Zone (COMMZ): The region that connects the part of an army actually fighting with its sources of supply. It is a part of the theater of operations behind the combat zone. Within this zone are supply and evacuation establishments, repair shops, and other service facilities.

CONUS: Continental United States.

CPX: Command post exercise.

CRAF: Civil Reserve Air Fleet.

DA: Department of the Army.

DCSLOG: Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

DOD: Department of Defense.

E-day: The day plans became orders.

EP 201: Emergency Plan 201.

EUCOM: European Command.

Indigenous labor: Native people hired for various tasks in support of a military operation.

JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Logistics: Art of planning and carrying out military movement, evacuation, and supply.

MATS: Military Air Transportation Service.

Measurement ton: Measure of cubic volume of cargo, expressed in units of 40 cubic feet. It is also used to indicate the cubic capacity of a ship's available cargo space.

MSTS: Military Sea Transportation Service.

OPLAN: Operations plan.

Organic support troops: Personnel assigned to a combat unit whose duties are to provide the internal combat service support for that unit.

Pentomic: A divisional organization consisting of five battle groups, each a self-contained force capable of independent operations. This organization was to provide the mobile units necessary for nuclear war.

Precut requisitions: The system of filing requisition forms in support of automatic resupply.

Pull system: A system whereby a unit asked, by means of a requisition, for materiel that was then acquired by the support unit and sent to the asking unit.

Push-pull system: A system whereby a unit predetermines its own needs for an upcoming operation. The materiel is then packaged in sets of determined quantity, and, after the unit is deployed, it requests by requisition a specific number of these sets as needed. The support unit then sends the required number of sets.

Push system: A system whereby automatic requisitioned materiel is sent by support units to using units on a predetermined time schedule.

ROCID: Reorganization of Current Infantry Divisions.

Roll-on/Roll-off ship: A ship in which vehicles can drive on and drive off under their own power.

ROTAD: Reorganization of the Airborne Division.

Sea tail: That part of an airborne or air-transported unit that is not committed to combat by air and will join the organization by sea travel.

SETAF: Southern European Task Force.

Short ton: 2,000 pounds or 0.907 metric tons. Often used in place of long ton (2,240 pounds) to simplify calculations.

SPECOMME: Specified Command, Middle East.

STRAC: Strategic Army Corps.

Supported forces: Forces receiving support either from combat units or combat service support units.

Supporting forces: Forces providing the support to the supported forces and not under the command of the supported forces.

Technical service: One of the branches of the Army, such as the Quartermaster Corps or the Ordnance Department, whose chief mission was the procurement and distribution of supplies needed by various units of the Army.

TOE: Table of organization and equipment.

Ton miles: The lift capacity to carry 2,000 pounds one mile. It would take one million ton miles to carry 1,000 tons 1,000 miles.

Unit requisitions: A method of filing requisitions in support of a pull system.

USAREUR: U.S. Army, Europe.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR



Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade

Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade is a Research Fellow for Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Cameron University and a master's in history from Lincoln University. Lieutenant Colonel Wade was commissioned upon graduation from the Field Artillery Officer Candidate School in 1967 and served a combat tour in Vietnam. A 1982 graduate of USACGSC, he has taught in the ROTC department of Lincoln University and has commanded troops at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; the Federal Republic of Germany; and Turkey.

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